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Abstract: It is demonstrated how useful it is to utilize general logic-systems
to investigate finite consequence operators (operations). Among many other
examples relative to a lattice of finite consequence operators, a general logic-
system characterization for the lattice-theoretic supremum of a nonempty
collection of finite consequence operators is given. Further, it is shown that
for any denumerable language L there is a rather simple collection of finite
consequence operators and, for a propositional language, three simple modi-
fications to the finitary rules of inference that demonstrate that the lattice of
finite consequence operators is not meet-complete. This also demonstrates
that simple properties for such operators can be language specific. Using
general logic-systems, it is further shown that the set of all finite consequence
operators defined on L has the power of the continuum and each finite con-
sequence operator is generated by denumerably many general logic-systems.
Examples are given that define operators in terms of general logic-systems
so that the physical entities produced require that the basic logic-system
algorithm be applied.
Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000). 03B22, 03B65.
Keywords. Universal logic, general logic-systems, rules of inference, consequence
operators.
1. Introduction.
In order to avoid an ambiguous definition for the “finite consequence operator,”
it is assumed that a language L is a nonempty set within informal set-theory (ZF).
In the ordinary sense, a set A ⊂ L is finite if and only if A = ∅ or there exists a
bijection f :A → [1, n] = {x | (1 ≤ x ≤ n) and (n ∈ IN)}, where IN is the set of all
natural numbers including zero. It is always assumed that A is finite if and only if A is
Dedekind-finite. Finite always implies, in ZF, Dedekind-finite. There is a model η for
ZF that contains a set that is infinite and Dedekind-finite (Jech, 1971, pp. 116-118).
On the other hand, for ZF, if A is well-ordered or denumerable, then each B ⊂ A is
finite if and only if B is Dedekind-finite. In all cases, if the Axiom of Choice is adjoined
to the ZF axioms, finite is equivalent to Dedekind-finite. The definition of the general
and finite consequence operator is well know but can be found in Herrmann (2006,
2004, 2001, 1987).
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The subset map being consider has been termed as a (unary) “operation.” It has
also termed either as a consequence or a closure operator by Wo´jcicki (1981). Due to
its changed properties when embedded into a nonstandard structure, where for infinite
L the nonstandard extension of such a map is not a map on a power set to a power set
but remains, at least, a closure operator, these two names were later combined to form
the term consequence operator (Herrmann (1987)). In order to differentiate between
two types, either the word general or finite (or finitary) is often adjoined to this term
(Herrmann (2004)). Although finite consequence operators are closure operators with
a finite character, they have additional properties, due to their set-theoretic definition,
not shared, in general, by closure operators. Indeed, they have properties apparently
dependent upon the construction of the language elements (Tarski, 1956, p. 71).
Since Tarski’s introduction of consequence operator (Tarski, 1956, p. 60), although
he mentions that it is not required for his investigations, a language L upon which such
operators are defined has been assumed to have, at the least, a certain amount of
structure. For example, without further consideration, it has been assumed that L
can, at least, be considered as a semigroup or, often, a free algebra. Indeed, such struc-
tures have become “self-evident” hypotheses. In order to emphasize that such special
structures should not be assumed, the term “non-organized” is introduced (Herrmann
(2006)). Although independent structural properties may exist, they are not considered
in any manner as part of the hypotheses.
Formally, a non-organized L is a language where only “specifically stated” prop-
erties P1, P2, . . . are assumed and where either informal set theory or, if necessary,
informal set theory with the Axiom of Choice is used to establish theorems informally.
Hence, all other independent properties L might possess are ignored. Indeed, the only
property L is assumed to possess is the method of “word” formation from a non-empty
alphabet of symbols, images and other symbolized sensory information. When ap-
propriate, the term “non-specialized” is only used as a means to stress this standard
methodology.
2. General Logic-Systems.
In Herrmann (2006), the notion of a “logic-system” is discussed and an algorithm
is described not in complete detail. The algorithm is presented here, in detail, since
it is applied to most of the examples. In what follows, the algorithm, with associated
objects, defines a general logic-system that when applied to a specific case yields general
logic-system deduction. The process is exactly the same as used in formal logic except
for the use of the RI(L) as defined below. Informally, the pre-axioms is a nonempty
A ⊂ L. (The term “per-axioms” is used so as not to confuse these objects with the
notion of the “consequence operator axioms” C(∅).) The set of pre-axioms may contain
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any logical axiom and, in order not to include them with every set of hypotheses, A can
contain other objects N ⊂ L that are consider as “Theory Axioms” such as natural laws
as used for physical theories. There have been some rather nonspecific definitions for
the rules of inference and how they are applied. It is shown in Herrmann (2006) that,
for finite consequence operators, more specific definitions are required. A finitary rules
of inference is a fixed finite set RI(L) = {R1, . . . , Rp} of n-ary relations (0 < n ∈ IN)
on L. Note: it can happen that RI(L) = {∅}. (This corrects a misstatement made
in Herrmann (2006, p. 202.) The pre-axioms are considered as a unary relation in
RI(L). An infinite rules of inference is a fixed infinite set RI(L) of such n-ary relations
on L. A general rules of inference is either a fixed finitary or infinite set of rules of
inference. It is shown in Herrmann (2006), that there are finite consequence operators
that require an infinite RI(L), while others only require finite RI(L). The term “fixed”
means that no member of RI(L) is altered by any set X ⊂ L of hypotheses that are
used as discussed below. All RI(L), in this paper, are fixed. For the algorithm, it is
always assumed that an activity called deduction from a set of hypotheses X ⊂ L can
be represented by a finite (partial) sequence of numbered (in order) steps {b1, . . . , bm}
with the final step bm a consequence (result) of the deduction. Also, bm is said to be
“deduced” from X. All of these steps are considered as represented by objects in the
language L. Each such deduction is composed either of the zero step, indicating that
there are no steps in the sequence, or one or more steps with the last numbered step
being some m > 0. In this inductive step-by-step construction, a basic rule used to
construct a deduction is the insertion rule. If the construction is at the step number
m ≥ 0, then the insertion rule, I, can be applied. This rule states: Insertion of any
hypothesis (premise) from X ⊂ L, or insertion of a member from the set A, or the
insertion of any member of any other unary relation can be made and this insertion
is denoted by the next step number. Having more than one unary relation is often
very convenient in locating particular types of insertions. The pre-axioms are often
partitioned into, at the least, two unary relations. If the construction is at the step
number m > 0, then RI(L) allows for an additional insertion of a member from L
as a step number m + 1, in the following manner. For each (j + 1)-ary Ri, j ≥ 1, if
f ∈ Ri and f(k) ∈ {b1, . . . , bm}, k = 1, . . . , j, then f(j + 1) can be inserted as a step
number m + 1. In terms of the notation ⊢, where for A ⊂ L, X ⊢ A signifies that
each x ∈ A is obtained from some finite F ⊂ X by means of a deduction, it follows
from the above defined process that if X ⊢ b, then there is either (1) a nonempty finite
F = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊂ X such that F ⊢ b and each member of F is utilized in RI(L) to
deduce b, or (2) b is obtained by insertion of any member from any unary relation, or
(3) b is obtained using (2) by finitely many insertions and finitely many applications of
the other n-ary (n > 1) rules of inference. Hence, it follows that this algorithm yields
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the same “deduction from hypotheses” transitive property, as does formal logic, in that
X ⊢ Y ⊂ L and Y ⊢ Z ⊂ L imply that X ⊢ Z.
Note the possible existence of special binary styled relations J′ that can be mem-
bers of various RI(L). These relations are identity styled relations in that the first and
second coordinates are identical except that the second coordinate can carry one ad-
ditional symbol that is fixed for the language used. In scientific theory building, these
are used to indicate that a particular set of natural laws or processes does not alter
a particular premise that describes a natural-system characteristic. The characteristic
represented by this premise carries the special symbol and remains part of the final
conclusion. Scientifically, this can be a significant fact. The addition of this one special
symbol eliminates the need for the extended realism relation (Herrmann (2001)). Other
deductions deemed as extraneous are removed by restricting the language. The deduc-
tion is constructed only from either the rule of insertion or the rules of inference via
AG (notation for the entire algorithm as described in this and the previous paragraph.)
This concludes the definition of the logic-system. If RI(L) is known to be either finitary
or infinite, then the term “general” is often replaced by the corresponding term finite
or infinite, respectively.
For L, X ⊂ L, general rules of inference RI(L), and applications of AG, the
notation RI(L) ⇒ C means that the map C:P(L) → P(L) (P(L) = the power set of
L) is defined by letting C(X) = {x | (X ⊢ x) and (x ∈ L)}. The following result is
established here not because its “proof” is complex, but, rather, due to its significance.
Moreover, in Herrmann (2001), it is established in a slightly different manner and
the result as stated there is not raised to the level of a numbered theorem. Similar
theorems relative to general consequence operators viewed as closure operators have
been established in different ways using a vague notion of deduction. What follows is
a basic proof for the finite consequence operator using the required detailed definition
for a general logic-system deduction.
Theorem 2.1 Given non-specialized L, a general rules of inference RI(L) and
that the general logic-system algorithm AG is applied. If RI(L)⇒ C, then C is a finite
consequence operator.
Proof. Let C:P(L)→ P(L) be defined by application of the general logic-system
algorithm AG to each X ⊂ L using the general rules of inference RI(L). Let x ∈ X.
By insertion, {x} ⊢ x. Hence, X ⊂ C(X). If X ⊂ Y ⊂ L and x ∈ C(X), then there
is an F ∈ F(X) (= the set of all finite subsets of X) (= the set of all finite subsets
of X)such that F ⊢ x and F ⊂ Y. Hence, x ∈ C(Y ). Consequently, C(X) ⊂ C(Y ).
Let y ∈ C(C(X)). From the definition of C, (1) X ⊢ y if and only if y ∈ C(X).
By the transitive property for ⊢, C(X) ⊢ C(C(X)) implies that X ⊢ C(C(X)), and
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(1) still holds. Hence, if y ∈ C(C(X)), then X ⊢ y implies that y ∈ C(X). Thus,
C(C(X)) ⊂ C(X). Therefore, C(X) = C(C(X)) and C is a general consequence
operator. Let x ∈ C(X). Then, as before, there is an FF(X) such that F ⊢ x.
Consequently, C(X) ⊂
⋃
{C(F ) | F ∈ F(X)} ⊂ C(X) and C is a finite consequence
operator.
Let Cf (L) be the set of all finite consequence operators defined on P(L). Each C ∈
Cf (L) defines a specific general rules of inference RI
∗(C) such that RI∗(C)⇒ C∗ = C
(Herrmann (2006)). However, in general, RI(L) 6= RI∗(C).
Let C(L) be the set of all general consequence operators defined on P(L). Define
on C(L) a partial order ≤ as follows: for C1, C2 ∈ C(L), C1 ≤ C2 if and only if, for each
X ⊂ L, C1(X) ⊂ C2(X). The structure 〈C(L),≤〉 is a complete lattice. The meet, ∧, is
defined as follows: C1∧C2 = C3, where for each X ⊂ L, C3(X) = C1(X)∩C2(X). For
each nonempty H ⊂ C(L),
∧
H means that, for each X ⊂ L, (
∧
H)(X) =
⋂
{C(X) |
C ∈ H} and, further,
∧
H = inf H.
As is customary, in all of the following examples, explicit n-ary relations are rep-
resented in n-tuple form. Relative to the operator ∪, in the same manner as done in
Herrmann (2006), if {a, b, c, d} ⊂ L, {{(a, b), (c, d)}} ⇒ B, and {{(a, c)}} ⇒ R, then
defining B ∨R as (B ∨ R)(X) = B(X) ∪ R(X) = K(X) yields that K /∈ C(L). Thus,
C(L) is not closed under the ∨ operator as defined in this manner. Hence, if “combined”
deduction is defined by this particular ∨, then, in general, the combination does not
follow the usual deductive procedures used through out mathematics and the physical
sciences.
Lemma 2.7 in Herrmann (2004) can be improved by simply assuming that
B ⊂ P(L), L ∈ B. The same proof as lemma 2.7 yields that the map defined by
C(X) =
⋂
{Y | (X ⊂ Y ) and (Y ∈ B)} ∈ C(L). For a given C ∈ C(L), Y ⊂ L is
a C-system (closed system) if and only if Y = C(Y ) (a closure operator fixed point).
For each C ∈ C(L), let S(C) be the set of all C-systems. The equationally defined
S(C) = {C(X) | X ⊂ L} and L ∈ S(C). (If B is a closure system (i.e. closed
under arbitrary intersection Wo´jcicki (1981) and B defines C, then B = S(C).) For
nonempty H ⊂ Cf (L), let nonempty S
′ =
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ H}. Using B = S′, if,
for each X ⊂ L, (
∨
wH)(X) =
⋂
{Y | (Y ⊂ L) and (X ⊂ Y ) and (Y ∈ S′)},
then, for 〈C(L),≤〉,
∨
wH = sup H. The set of all consequence operators defined
on P(L) forms a complete lattice 〈C(L),∧,∨w, I, U〉 with lower unit I, the identity
map, and upper unit U, where for each X ⊂ L, U(X) = L. If Cf (L) is restricted to
〈C(L),∧,∨w, I, U〉, then 〈Cf (L),∧,∨w, I, U〉 is a sublattice. It is shown in Herrmann
(2004), that 〈Cf (L),∧,∨w, I, U〉 is a join-complete sublattice. (Note: Corollary 2.11 in
the published version of Herrmann (2004) should read ∅ 6= A ⊂ Cf .) Using finitary rules
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of inference, the fact that ∪ is not, in general, a satisfactory join operator for 〈S(C),⊂〉
is easily established. Consider non-specialized L such that {a, b, c, d} ⊂ L. Define
RI(L) = {{(a, c)}, {(a, b, c, d)}} ⇒ B. Then B({b}) ∪ B({a}) = {a, b, c}. But, {a, b, c}
is not a C-system for B since B({a, b, c}) = {a, b, c, d}. Defining for each C ∈ C(L) and
each X, Y ∈ S(C), X ⊎ Y = C(X ∪ Y ), then the structure 〈S(C),⊂〉 is a complete
lattice with the join ⊎ and meet X ∧ Y = X ∩ Y.
For each non-specialized language L and non-empty H ⊂ Cf (L), a natural inves-
tigation would be to determine whether there is a significant relation between
∨
wH
and any collection of general logic-systems that generates each member of H. For each
C ∈ H, let RIC(L) be any general rules of inference such that RIC(L)⇒ C.
Theorem 2.2. If L is non-specialized, then for the structure 〈Cf (L),∧,∨w, I, U〉
and each nonempty H ⊂ Cf (L), it follows that
⋃
{RIC(L) | C ∈ H} ⇒
∨
wH.
Proof. For H, let
⋃
{RIx(L) | x ∈ H} ⇒ U , X ⊂ L, and C ∈ H. Since C ≤ U ,
then U(X) ⊂ C(U(X)) ⊂ U(U(X)) = U(X) implies that U(X) = C(U(X)). Thus, for
each C ∈ H, U(X) is a C-system and, hence, U(X) ∈ S′ =
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ H}.
Suppose that X ⊂ Y ∈ S′. Then, for each C ∈ H, X ⊂ Y = C(Y ) implies that,
for each C ∈ H, X ⊂ U(X) ⊂ U(C(Y )). Consider b ∈ U(C(Y )). Take any finite
F ⊂ Y = C(Y ) such that F is used to obtain b by application of AG as the next step in
a deduction using
⋃
{RIx(L) | x ∈ H}. Then F is used along with finitely many (≥ 0)
RICi(L) ⇒ Ci ∈ H to obtain {b1, . . . , bm}. Since for each i ∈ [1, k], bi ∈ C
′(Y ) = Y,
for some C′ ∈ H, then {b1, . . . , bm} ⊂ Y. If b /∈ {b1, . . . , bn}, then there are finitely
many (≥ 0) RICj (L) ⇒ Cj ∈ H and from F and {b1, . . . , bn} the set {c1, . . . , ck} is
deduced. But again {c1, . . . , ck} ⊂ Y. This process will continue no more than finitely
many times until b is obtain as a member of a finite set of deductions from members
of
⋃
{RIx(L) | x ∈ H} and b ∈ Y. Hence, U(C(Y )) ⊂ Y. But, C(Y ) = Y implies that
Y ⊂ U(C(Y )). Hence, Y = U(C(Y )) = U(Y ) and, since U(X) ⊂ U(Y ), then U(X) ⊂
Y = C(Y ) for each C ∈ H. Therefore, U(X) ⊂ Y ∈ S′. Hence, U(X) = (
∨
wH)(X).
After showing that Cf (L) is closed under finite ∧, then Theorem 2.2 yields a general
logic-system proof that 〈Cf (L),∧,∨w, I, U〉 is a join-complete lattice. It is rather obvi-
ous that, in general, if RIC(L)⇒ C and RID(L)⇒ D, then RIC(L)∩RID(L) 6⇒ C∧D.
For example, let {a, b, c, d} ⊂ L and RIC(L) = {{(a, b)}}, RID(L) = {{(a, b), (b, c)}}.
Then C({a}) = {a, b}, D({a}) = {a, b, c} implies that (C ∧ D)({a}) = {a, b}.
But, RIC(L) ∩ RID(L) = ∅ ⇒ I and I({a}) = {a}. Even if we took the intersec-
tion, ∩1, of the individual relations from each general rules of inference, then, for
RIE(L) = {{(a, b), (b, c)}} and RIF (L) = {{(a, b), (b, d), (d, c)}}, it would follow that
RIE(L)∩1RIF (L) 6⇒ E∧F. However, it is obvious that, for each nonempty H ⊂ Cf (L),
if
⋂
{RIx(L) | x ∈ H} ⇒ G ∈ H, then G =
∧
H.
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There is a constraint that can be placed on deduction from hypotheses using
algorithm AG. With one exception, there is a RI(L) that if the restricted RI(L)⇒ D,
then D is not a general consequence operator.
Example 2.2. (Limiting the number of steps in an RI(L)-deduction need not yield
a consequence operator.) Suppose that AG has the added restriction that no deduction
from hypotheses be longer then n steps, where n > 1. For each L, such that |L| ≥ n+1,
let a 6= b, for i ∈ [1, n − 1], xi /∈ {a, b}, {xi, a, b} ⊂ L, and if i, j ∈ [1, n − 1], i 6= j,
then xi 6= xj . Consider RI(L) = {{(x1, . . . , xn−1, a)}, {(a, b)}}. Let ⊢≤n indicate that
each deduction from premises, using RI(L), most have n or fewer steps. Then, using
this restriction, for X ⊂ L, let D(X) = {x | (X ⊢≤n x) and (x ∈ L)}. Consider
X = {x1, . . . , xn−1}. Then D(X) = X∪{a}. But D(D(X)) = D(X∪{a}) = X∪{a, b}.
This follows since the definition requires that you calculate in no more than n steps
all of the consequences of {x1, . . . , xn−1, a} using any finite subset of {x1, . . . , xn−1, a}.
Thus, D2 6= D and D /∈ C(L). Let PR be a standard predicate language (Mendelson,
1987, pp. 55-56), where PR has more than one predicate with one or more arguments
and with the set of variables V. Let R1 be the set of all axioms, R2 = {(A, (∀xA)) |
(x ∈ V) and (A ∈ PR)} and R3 = {(A → B), A, B) | A,B ∈ PR}. If you restrict
predicate deduction to 3 steps or less, then restricted RI(PR)⇒ CP and CP is not a
general consequence operator.
3. Special Consequence Operators.
Throughout this section, unless other specific properties are stated, the language
L is non-specialized. In Herrmann (1987), two significant collections of consequence
operators are defined. Let X ∪ Y ⊂ L. (1) Define the map C(X, Y ):P(L) → P(L) as
follows: for A ∈ P(L) and A∩Y 6= ∅, C(X, Y )(A) = A∪X . If A∩Y = ∅, C(X, Y )(A) =
A. (2) Define the map C′(X, Y ):P(L) → P(L) as follows: for A ∈ P(L) and Y ⊂
A, C′(X, Y )(A) = A∪X . If Y 6⊂ A, C′(X, Y )(A) = A. It is shown in Herrmann (1987)
via long set-theoretic arguments that each C(X, Y ) ∈ Cf (L), and C
′(X, Y ) ∈ C(L). If
Y ∈ F(L), then C′(X, Y ) ∈ Cf (L). Now suppose that Y is infinite and Y ⊂ A. Then
for each F ∈ F(L), since Y 6⊂ F , then C′(X, Y )(F ) = F. Hence,
⋃
{C′(X, Y )(F ) | F ∈
F(A)} = A. But if X 6⊂ A, then C′(X, Y )(A) = A∪X 6=
⋃
{C′(X, Y )(F ) | F ∈ F(A)}.
Therefore, if infinite Y ⊂ A ⊂ L, and X 6⊂ A, then C′(X, Y ) ∈ C(L)− Cf (L). Thus, in
general, for infinite L, C′(X, Y ) need not be finite.
In some cases, the use of logic-systems can lead to rather short proofs for conse-
quence operator properties, where other methods require substantial effort.
Example 3.1. (An obvious sufficient condition for
∧
H ∈ Cf (L), when nonempty
H ⊂ Cf (L)) For non-specialized L, let nonempty H ⊂ Cf (L). If
⋂
{RIx(L) | x ∈ H} ⇒
G ∈ H, then G =
∧
H.
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Example 3.2. (Establishing that some significant general consequence operators
are finite.) We use logic-systems to show that C(X, Y ) ∈ Cf (L) and, if Y ∈ F(L), X ⊂
L, then C′(X, Y ) is finite. For C(X, Y ) if Y or X = ∅, let RI(L) = ∅ ⇒ I. If Y and
X 6= ∅, let RI = {R2}, where R2 = {(y, x) | (y ∈ Y ) and (x ∈ X)}. Then it follows
easily that RI(L) ⇒ C(X, Y ). Thus, C(X, Y ) is finite. If X = ∅, then C′(Y,X) = I
and RI ′(L) = ∅ ⇒ I. Now let Y ∈ F(L). If Y = ∅ and X 6= ∅, then let RI ′(L) = {R1},
where R1 = X. If X and Y 6= ∅, then there is an bijection f : [1, n] → Y . In this
case, let RI ′(L) = {{(f(1), . . . , f(n), x) | x ∈ X}}. Then RI ′(L)⇒ C′(X, Y ). Hence, if
Y ∈ F(L), then C′(X, Y ) ∈ Cf (L).
Relative to a standard propositional language PD, after some extensive analysis
and using the  Los´ and Suszko matrix theorem, Wo´jcicki (1973) defines a collection of
k-valued matrix generated finite consequence operators {C∗k | k = 2, 3, 4, . . .} such that
the greatest lower bound for this set in the lattice 〈C(PD),≤〉 is not a finite consequence
operator. Are there simpler examples that lead to the same conclusion?
Example 3.3. (Showing that, in general, 〈Cf (L),∧,∨w, I, U〉 is not a meet-
complete lattice.) Let L be any denumerable language. Hence, there is a bijection
f : IN→ L. Define Bn = f [[1, n]] for each n ∈ IN
>0, where IN>0 = {n | (n ∈ IN) and (n ≥
1)}. Then for each n ∈ IN>0, f(0) 6∈ Bn. Let X = {f(0)} and Cn = C
′(X,Bn).We have
that inf{C′(X,Bn) | (n ≥ 1) and (n ∈ IN)} = C
′(X, f [IN] − {f(0)}) ≤ C′(X,Bn) for
each Bn. But, since f [IN]−{f(0)} is an infinite set and, for A = f [IN]−{f(0)}, X 6⊂ A,
then C′(X, f [IN]−{f(0)}) is not a finite consequence operator. The fact that this con-
sequence operator is not finite also holds for non-denumerable infinite L, where L either
has additional structure, or an additional set-theoretical axiom such as the Axiom of
Choice is utilized.
Of course, C′(X, Y ) is not the usual type of consequence operator one would
associate with a propositional language. Are there simple finite consequence operators
associated with standard formal propositional deduction that are not meet-complete?
Using finite logic-systems, the following examples show how various weakenings
for deduction relative to, at least, a propositional language PD, generate collections
of consequence operators that also establish that 〈Cf (PD),∧,∨w, I, U〉 is not a meet-
complete lattice.
The propositional language PD defined by denumerably many (distinct) propo-
sitional variables P = {Pn | n ∈ IN}, and is constructed in the usual manner from
the unary ¬ and binary → operations. For the standard propositional calculus and
deduction, one can use the following sets of axioms, with parenthesis suppression
applied. R1 = {X → (Y → X) | (X ∈ PD) and (Y ∈ PD)}, R2 = {(X →
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(Y → Z)) → ((X → Y ) → (X → Z)) | (X ∈ PD) and (Y ∈ PD) and (Z ∈
PD)}, R3 = {(¬X → ¬Y ) → (Y → X) | (X ∈ PD) and (Y ∈ PD)}. The one
rule of inference MP = R3(PD) = {(X → Y,X, Y ) | (X ∈ PD) and (Y ∈ PD)}.
Let R1(PD) = R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3. Standard proposition deduction PD uses the rules of
inference RI(PD) = {R1(PD), R3(PD)} ⇒ CPD. Let T be the set of all PD tautolo-
gies under the standard valuation. Then by the soundness and completeness theorems
T = CPD(∅). In all of the following examples, R1, R2, R3, R
1(PD), R3(PD) are as
defined in this paragraph and RI(PD) is modified in various ways
Example 3.3.1. (Propositional deduction with a restricted Modus Ponens rule
yields {Cn} ⊂ Cf (L) such that
∧
{Cn} /∈ Cf (L).) Consider PD. Let J = {((Pi →
P0), Pi, P0) | i ∈ IN
>0}. Let H = R3(PD)−J . For each n ∈ IN>0, let R3n = H∪{((Pn →
P0), Pn, P0)}. Thus, the Modus Ponens rule of inference is restricted for each n ∈ IN
>0.
Let RIn(PD) = {R
1(PD), R3n} ⇒ Cn. Now let X = {(Pn → P0), Pn | n ∈ IN
>0}.
Then, for all n ∈ IN>0, P0 ∈ Cn(X). Hence, P0 ∈ (
∧
{Cn})(X). Consider for any
n ∈ IN>0, F ∈ F(X) such that P0 ∈ Cn(F ). Since P0 /∈ T , then P0 /∈ Cn(∅) implies
that F 6= ∅. Further, for some k ∈ IN>0, {(Pk → P0), Pk} ⊂ F. For, assume not.
First, consider, for n ∈ IN>0, {(Pj → P0), Pk} ⊂ F, {k, j} ⊂ IN
>0, k 6= j and assume
that (Pj → P0), Pk ⊢n P0. This implies that ⊢n (Pj → P0) → (Pk → P0), where
the part of the Deduction Theorem being used here does not require any of the objects
removed from the original R3(PD). But, ⊢n implies |=PD, using the standard valuation
which is not dependent upon our restriction. Hence. |=PD (Pj → P0) → (Pk → P0).
However, 6|=PD (Pj → P0) → (Pk → P0). The same would result, for k ∈ IN
>0, if
only the wwfs Pk, or only wwfs (Pk → P0) are members of F . Hence, there exists a
unique M = max{i | ((Pi → P0) ∈ F ) and (Pi ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)}. But, then P0 /∈
CM+1(F ). Consequently, this implies that P0 /∈ (
∧
{Cn})(F ). Thus,
⋃
{(
∧
{Cn})(F ) |
F ∈ F(X)} 6= (
∧
{Cn})(X) yields that
∧
{Cn} ∈ C(PD)− Cf (PD).
For each R ⊂ R1(PD), always consider the standard elementary valuations for
propositional wwfs. Also, if R ⊂ R1(PD), X ⊂ PD, and one considers the rules of
inference RIR(PD) = {R,R
3(PD)} ⇒ CR, then X ⊢R A implies that X ⊢PD A.
Hence, if X ⊢R A, then, for each x ∈ A, there is some F ∈ F(X) such that F |=PD x.
Although, T = CPD(∅), in general, T 6= CR(∅). However, we do have that T ⊃ CR(∅).
Example 3.3.2. (PD axioms with a missing atom P0 yields {C
′
m} ⊂ Cf (PD)
such that
∧
{C′m} /∈ Cf (PD).) Consider PD. Let L
′ be the propositional language
defined by the set of propositional variables {Pi | i ∈ IN} − {P0}. For each m ∈ IN
>0,
let Jm = (¬P0 → ¬Pm)→ (Pm → P0), and let R
′
1, R
′
2, R
′
3 be defined for the language
L′, in the same manner as R1, R2, R3 are defined for L, and let R
3(PD) be defined
for PD. Let R1 = R′1 ∪R
′
2 ∪R
′
3, and, for each m ∈ IN
>0, R1m = {R
1 ∪ {Jm}}. For each
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m ∈ IN>0, the rules of inference is the set RI ′m(PD) = {R
1
m, R
3(PD)} ⇒ C′m and, for
this rules of inference, the P0 only appears in Jm ∪ R
3(PD). For any deduction, the
Modus Ponens (MP) rule is applied to previous steps. Thus, no deduction, from empty
hypotheses,using R1 can either lead to any wwf that includes P0 or utilize any wwf that
contains P0. The only member of the R
1
m that is not a premise and can be used for a
deduction that contains P0 is Jm. Let X = {(¬P0 → ¬Pn), Pn | n ∈ IN
>0}. Obviously,
for each m ∈ IN>0, P0 ∈ C
′
m(X) and, since Jm ∈ T and P0 /∈ T , then P0 /∈ C
′
m(∅).
Consider for each m ∈ IN>0, nonempty A ∈ {Jn, (¬P0 → ¬Pn), Pn, P0 | (m 6= n ∈
IN
>0)}. Then 6⊢m A. For example, letA = Jn n 6= m. This would imply that ⊢m Jn. But,
since Jm 6= Jn and there is no member of R
1 to which MP applies, such a deduction is
not possible. The same holds for (¬P0 → ¬Pn), Pn, P0. Further, for A and for j 6= m or
k 6= m, (¬P0 → ¬Pj), ¬Pk 6⊢m P0 for the same reasons. Consider for each m ∈ IN
>0,
any nonempty F ∈ F(X) such that P0 ∈ C
′
m(F ). Then, from the above discussion,
(¬P0 → ¬Pm), Pm ∈ F. Let a = max{i | ((¬P0 → Pi) ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)}, b =
max{i | (Pi ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)}. Let M = max{a, b}. Then, again from the above
discussion, P0 /∈ C
′
M+1(F ). Hence, P0 /∈
⋃
{(
∧
{C′m})(F ) | F ∈ F(X)} 6= (
∧
{C′m})(X)
and
∧
{C′m} ∈ C(PD)− Cf (PD).
Example 3.3.3. (Extended positive propositional deduction (PD axiom restric-
tions) yields {Cn} ⊂ Cf (L) such that
∧
{Cn} /∈ Cf (L).) Consider PD. As defined above
T is the set of all A ∈ PD such that A is a tautology. The h-rule is defined as follows:
for each A ∈ L, let h(A) denote the wwf that results from erasing each ¬ that appears
in A. Now let R′3 = {X | (X ∈ R3) and (h(X) ∈ T )}. Then ∅ 6= R
′
3 6= R3 since if
h(A) ∈ T , then h((¬A → ¬B) → (B → A)) = (h(A)→ h(B)) → (h(B) → h(A)) ∈ T
and (¬P0 → ¬Pn)→ (Pn → P0) /∈ R
′
3, n 6= 0. Let R
1 = R1 ∪R2 ∪R
′
3 and RIh(PD) =
{R1, R3(PD)} ⇒ Ch. For each n ∈ IN
>0, let Jn = (¬P0 → ¬Pn) → (Pn → P0) and
the rules of inference be RIn(PD) = {R
1 ∪ {Jn}, R
3(PD)} ⇒ Cn. Each member of
R1 is a tautology. Further, if A ∈ R1, h(A) ∈ T and if A, A → B ∈ R1, then
h(A → B) = h(A) → h(B) implies that h(B) ∈ T . Thus, for each A ∈ R1, the h op-
erator coupled with any MP application using members of R1 yields a tautology. This
operator acts as a concrete model for deduction from empty hypotheses using members
of R1. But for certain members of R3, the h-rule does not generate a tautology and
these members of R3 are, therefore, not members of Ch(∅). That is, for R1 ∪R2 ∪ R
′
3
they are not RIh(PD) theorems. Each Jn is a wwf that cannot be established by
RIh(PD) deduction (i.e. Jn /∈ Ch(∅)). Consider for any n ∈ IN
>0, A ⊢n B. This
can always be written as Jn, A ⊢n B. Suppose that for each m,n, k ∈ IN
>0, k 6= n,
that Xm = (¬P0 → ¬Pm) and Xm, Pk ⊢n P0. Since the derivation of the Deduction
Theorem does not utilize R3, then this implies that ⊢n Jn → (Xm → (Pk → P0)).
This can be considered as a deduction that does not use Jn as a premise. Hence,
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this implies that ⊢h Jn → (Xm → (Pk → P0)). However, this contradicts the h-rule.
Also notice that Jm = (Xm → (Pm → P0)). Hence, for each m,n, k ∈ IN
>0, k 6= n;
Xm, Pk 6⊢n P0, implies that for any nonempty A ⊂ {Xm, Pk | m, k ∈ IN
>0) and (k 6= n)},
that P0 /∈ Cn(A). However, for each n ∈ IN
>0, P0 ∈ Cn({Xn, Pn}). This also shows
that for each m,n ∈ IN>0, n 6= m, that Cn({Xm, Pm}) 6= Cm({Xm, Pm}), and that
Cn 6= Cm. Obviously, since P0 /∈ T implies that, for each n ∈ IN
>0, 6⊢n P0, then, for
each n ∈ IN>0, P0 /∈ Cn(∅). Now let Y = {(¬P0 → ¬Pi), Pi | i ∈ IN
>0}. Then, for
each n ∈ IN>0, P0 ∈ Cn(Y ). Thus P0 ∈ (
∧
{Cn | n ∈ IN
>0})(Y ). Consider for each
j ∈ IN>0, any F ∈ F(Y ) such that P0 ∈ Cj(F ). Then F 6= ∅. If {i | ((¬P0 → ¬Pi) ∈
F ) and (i ∈ IN>0)} 6= ∅, let a = max{i | ((¬P0 → ¬Pi) ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)}. If
{i | (Pi ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)} 6= ∅, let b = max{i | (Pi ∈ F ) and (i ∈ IN
>0)}. The
set {a, b} 6= ∅. Let M = max{a, b}. It has been shown that P0 /∈ CM+1(F ). Hence,
from this, it follows that P0 /∈
⋃
{(
∧
{Cn})(F ) | F ∈ F(Y )} 6= (
∧
{Cn})(Y ) and
∧
{Cn} ∈ C(PD)− Cf (PD).
For the two collections {Cn}, {Cm} ⊂ Cf (L) defined in the last two examples,
notice that
⋂
RI ′m(PD) =
⋂
RIn(PD) = {R
3(PD)} ⇒ G ∈ Cf (L), G(∅) = ∅, G <
∧
{Cn}. The rule of inference {R
3I(PD)} yields axiomless propositional deduction.
Example 3.4. (For denumerable L, the set Cf (L) has the power of the continuum.)
For any set X , let |X | denote its cardinality (power). For the real numbers IR, |IR| is
often denoted by ℵ or c. For a denumerable language L, let a ∈ L and consider L−{a}.
Let I be the set of all infinite subsets of L − {a}. Then |I| = ℵ. For any X ∈ I, let
RX = {(a, x) | x ∈ X} and RIX(L) = {RX} ⇒ CX . Then CX({a}) = {a} ∪ X. Let
A,B ∈ I, A 6= B. Then CA({a}) = {a} ∪ A 6= {a} ∪ B = CB({a}). Thus |{CX | X ∈
I}| = ℵ. Hence |Cf (L)| ≥ ℵ.
On the other hand, each C ∈ Cf (L) corresponds to a general logic-system RI
∗(C)
such that RI∗(C) ⇒ C (Herrmann (2006)). From the definition of a general rules
of inference, RI∗(C) corresponds to a finite or denumerable subset of
⋃
({Ln | n ∈
IN
>0}. But, P(
⋃
({Ln | n ∈ IN>0}) = ℵ. Hence, |Cf (L)| ≤ ℵ. Consequently, |Cf (L)| = ℵ.
(Depending upon the definition of “infinite,” this result may require the Axiom of
Choice.)
Example 3.5. (For denumerable L, there exists denumerably many general logic-
systems that generate a specific C ∈ Cf (L).) Let C ∈ Cf (L). Let RI
∗(C) be the general
logic-system defined in Herrmann (2006), where RI∗(C) ⇒ C. Notice that when the
RI∗(C)-deduction algorithm is used, it can be considered as applied to
⋃
RL∗(C).
For ∅ 6= X ∈ F(L), where |X | = n ∈ IN and n ≥ 1, consider any finite sequence
{x1, . . . , xn} = X. Define RX = {(x1, . . . , xn, x) | x ∈ X}. Let general logic-system
RI1(L) = {RX | X ∈ F(L)}. Then RI1(L) ⇒ C1 ∈ Cf (L). Let Y ∈ P(L). If
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Y = ∅, then C1(∅) = ∅. For nonempty Y ∈ P(L), let y ∈ C1(Y ), then y is de-
duced via the general logic-system algorithm. Hence, there exists a nonempty finite
A = {y1, . . . , yn} = Y ⊂ L such that (y1, . . . , yn, y) ∈ RI1(L) and y ∈ Y. Hence,
C1(Y ) ⊂ Y implies that C1(Y ) = Y. Thus, C1 is the identity finite consequence opera-
tor.
Let RI+(L) = RI1(L) ∪ RI
∗(C) and note that RI+(L) ⇒ C. For each n ∈ IN>0,
there exists rn ∈
⋃
RI+(L), such that rn = (x1, . . . , xn, x), i = 1, . . . , n and x ∈
C({x1, . . . , xn}). Thus, there exists a unique nonempty R
+
n ⊂
⋃
RI+(L) such that rn ∈
R+n if and only if pi(rn) = xi ∈ L, 1, . . . n. The general logic-system RI
∗∗(L) = {R1}∪
{R+k | k ∈ IN
>0} ⇒ C, where R1 = C(∅). (Notice that if A ⊂ R1, then C(A) = R1.)
For each n ∈ IN, n ≥ 2, let (y1, . . . , yn) be a distinct permutation p of the coordinates
xi, i = 1, . . . , n, for a specific rn = (x1, . . . , xn, x) ∈ R
+
n . Let r
p
n = (y1, . . . , yn, x) and
R+n,p = (R
+
n − {rn}) ∪ {r
p
n}. This yields RI
p
n(L) = (RI
∗∗(L) − {R+n }) ∪ {R
+
n,p} ⇒ C.
If {m,n} ⊂ IN, m, n ≥ 2, m 6= n, then RIpn(L) 6= RI
p
m(L). Further, if p, q are two
distinct permutations, then RIpn(L) 6= RI
q
n(L). Hence, for each n ∈ IN, n ≥ 2, there
exists n! distinct general logic-systems that generate the same C ∈ Cf (L). Whether,
for each n ∈ IN, n ≥ 2, only one distinct permutation or each of the n! permutations
are utilized to define distinct general logic-systems, this implies that there exists a
denumerable collection of general logic-systems each member of which generates C.
4. GGU-model Operators.
Of significance to physical science is the use of logic-systems to generate the de-
velopment of a universe. For the General Grand Unification Model (GGU-model),
logic-system behavior implies that physical-systems are designed from rationally or-
dered combinations of constituents and each complete physical-system follows a ratio-
nal development over observer-time. Their application to the GGU-model appears in
Herrmann (2013a) and (2013b).
5. A Formal Measurement of Intelligence.
General logic-systems can yield a measure for intelligence via the seventh Thur-
stone (1941) factor - “Reasoning” ability. For the GGU-model, the hyperfinite logic-
system used is the Kq1 as it is preserved by the operators IN q, Gq and St. Moreover,
what follows is but one measure, among others, for the ability to reason.
Definition 5.1 Intelligence, for GID-model, is the ability to apply rules specified
by an algorithm and to obtain from a given logic-system distinct deductive conclusions
or a specific conclusion. This ability is measured over a specific time interval. The
measure itself is the number of reasoned distinct conclusions that can be obtained
during that time interval or whether the final conclusion is the one specified.
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Intelligence, as measured by Definition 5.1, has significant meaning via comparison.
Consider the hyper-interval ∗ [ci, ci+1] and the hyperfinite logic-systemK
q
1(λ) restricted
to this hyper-interval. Consider the informal standard general logic-system Kq1 obtained
from Kq1 by restriction. Let agent A be a standard agent that can perform only finitely
many [i.e. n] deductions over a time internal of length ci+1 − ci. (The first step is
Fq(tq(i, 0)).) This is generalized to a set of “superagents” A where for each n ∈ IN, n >
0, there is a member of A that can deduce n distinct members of dq during this time
interval. Hence, for any n ∈ IN, n > 0, there is a superagent An that can obtain n
distinct deductions over time period ci+1 − ci.
Formally characterizing the “number” of distinct deductions that a superagent can
make, this number can be compared with hyperfinite set of deductions. Consider the
λ in Theorems 4.q (Herrmann (2006b)). There exists a superagent agent H that can
deduce λ+1 distinct members of dqx. If one does not include the notion of superagents,
then assume that an agent H exists that can do hyper-deduction. In mathematical
logic, one can assign the superagent notion to such statements as “for the formal
predict logic and any n ∈ IN, n > 0, there are well-formed formulas (formal theorems)
that require n or more steps to deduce.” (There are multi-universe models that do
allow for superagents to exist in the sense that deductions can be continued via other
agents indefinitely. Thus, in this case, a superagent is a finite collection of agents or,
depending upon the cosmology, a single agent.) Definition 6.1 can be interpreted as
follows: For an agent H that can do hyper-deduction, agent H is, in general, infinitely
more intelligent than standard agent A ∈ A and, in general, can obtain conclusions
that A cannot. (In a few special cases, although it is not considered as deduction,
special analysis can determine all the values of { ∗Fq( ∗tq(i, j)) | 0 ≤ j ≤ λ}.)
6. Potentially-Infinite.
This entire section has been removed since apparently the C-set theory axioms do
not allow one to conclude that the set employed in Theorem 6.2 (i) exists.
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